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Abstract
This paper uses data on Taiwan stock market over a long sample period to examine
whether there exist the e#ect of congressional session. These results provide evidences that the
congressional e#ect is negative e#ect on stock returns but volatilities are not signiﬁcant.
However, the congressional e#ect on stock market returns following ﬁnancial reform sig-
niﬁcantly dropped, and signiﬁcantly increased for the volatilities in the same circumstances.
The empirical result implies that the investors rationally measure stock market e$ciently
reﬂect congressional activity and adjust their expectations to alter portfolio allocation accord-
ingly.
Keywords: Political uncertainty, Congressional e#ect, Volatility asymmetry, EGARCH-M
JEL Classiﬁcation: D89
I. Introduction
Politics signiﬁcantly inﬂuences ﬁnancial markets. Stock markets generally respond to new
information regarding political decisions that may a#ect domestic and foreign policy. As such,
market e$ciency requires that stock markets absorb news and political events into stock prices
in anticipation of outcomes of political uncertainty. Hence positive stock returns are expected
following the resolution of political uncertainty. In contrast, if the outcome of the political
uncertainty does not allow investors to immediately measure the negative impact on the stock
 Corresponding author.
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While political uncertainty takes di#erent shapes, this paper focuses on one particular
kind of political uncertainty associated with congressional sessions (Michelson, 1993; Lamb,
Pace and Kennedy, 1997). In mature democracies, legislative institutions are always important
in curbing the powers of the president or premier and holding national stability (such as
Congress and Parliament). Most of the uncertainty regarding major bills, budgets and other
important national a#airs are determined through decisions by vote or political negotiation
during congress sessions. Therefore, the information discharged from congressional sessions
creates the ambiguous political situation to prevent investors from predicting the future of the
country and revising their expectations. In contrast, the recess of congress brings a temporary
end to political struggle and so should induce positive stock market return.
Taiwan Congress, the Legislative Yuan, is the top legislative institution and played an
important role on the path to Taiwan’s democratization. The last of the members elected in
1948 retired on December 31, 1991. Moreover, the 130 new members elected in 1989 wielded
legislative power on behalf of the people. These developments represented an important step in
the democratic reform of Taiwan. In December 1992, based on the amendment to the
Constitution, 161 members of the Second Legislative Yuan were elected. In December 1995,
164 members of the Third Legislative Yuan were elected. Taiwanese democracy thus ﬁnally
became ﬁrmly established.
Democratically elected legislative assemblies are empowered to decide by vote matters
such as budgetary bills, auditing reports and other important a#airs of state. Moreover such
assembles can curb the powers of the president and premier. Discussing and deciding upon
budgetary and major bills are the best way for the Legislative Yuan to supervise government
administration. However, not many academic researches have explored the stock market
behavior during the lasting political uncertainty created by congressional disputes.
Speciﬁcally, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the response of stock market to
political uncertainty during congressional sessions in Taiwan. Employing univariate asymmet-
ric GARCH model, we utilize stock return volatility as measures of the impact of political
uncertainty during congressional period to explore the dynamic relationship between ﬁnancial
market reaction and political behavior in the Legislative Yuan. Second, we discriminated the
di#erent type of congressional e#ect further (for example, the government bills, statutory bills
introduced by legislators and emergency bills, see Appendix 1), and illustrated what type of
congressional e#ect can improve investor’s substantive understanding of certain political
phenomenon in the Legislative Yuan. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related literature. Section 3 then presents EGARCH models of ﬁnancial returns. Next,
section 4 describes the preliminary analysis and presents empirical evidence. Finally, section 5
discusses the results and presents conclusions.
II. Literature Review
Politics and that economy are inextricably linked; that is, they have signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on each other, and cannot be separated. The economy has its own cycles in which market
volatility can generate economic depression and uncertainty. Hence, whether political factors
a#ect the economy has been an important area of analysis (Nordhaus, 1975; Soh, 1986; Milas,
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December ,**2000). Other studies have found that the impact of di#erent political behavior signiﬁcantly
a#ect economic variables (Bratsiotis, 2000; Cover and VanHoose, 2000).
Furthermore, recent researches have examined market e$ciency by examining stock
market responses to uncertain political events. Most empirical investigations have focused on
tracking ﬁnancial market movements in relation to elections (Gemmill, 1992; Gwilym and
Buckle, 1994). Major studies supported the presidential election cycles, in which US stock
markets make larger gains in the third and fourth year of a presidential term, while average
returns in second year were found to be negative (Huang, 1985; Foerster, 1994; Stoken, 1994;
Foerster and Schmitz, 1997).
Other studies have focused on the stock market preference. Academic research on such
subject reported that small stock perform better under Democrats relative to Republicans.
(Reilly and Luksetich, 1980; Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003). Further empirical studies
examined the impact of various types of political information on stock markets (Bachman,
1992; Chan and Wei, 1996; Willard, Guinnane and Rosen, 1996; Bittlingmayer, 1998;
Pantzalis, Stangeland and Turtle, 2000; Kim and Mei, 2001; Perotti and Oijen, 2001; Hassan,
Maroney, El-Sady and Telfah, 2003).
Various political events signiﬁcantly inﬂuence stock market behavior, however, only a few
academic researches have explored the stock market behavior responses to congressional
calendar (Michelson, 1993; Lamb et al., 1997). Nevertheless, they merely mention about stock
return, and ignore stock volatility that reﬂected the unexpected shocks of political impact.
Therefore, the present study examines how stock returns and volatilities react to political
uncertainty, such as political disputes in Congress.
III. Methodology
1. The Sample Data
Daily Taiwan Stock Exchange Value Weighted Index (TAIEX) collected from Taiwan
Economic Journal (TEJ) used in this paper for the sample period from January 1, 1991 to May
31, 2005. Daily stock returns were calculated as the di#erence in the logarithms of daily stock
prices multiplied by 100.
According to constitution, the Legislative Yuan shall hold two sessions each year. The
ﬁrst session shall run from February to the end of May, and the second session from September
to the end of December. If necessary, the Legislative Yuan may hold an extra session either at
the request of the President or upon the request of more than one-fourth of the members.
Dates when the Legislative Yuan was in session and recess were obtained from the o$cial
records (http://www.ly.gov.tw/ly/en/01_introduce/01_introduce_01.jsp) that contained
about 35 sessions and 34 recesses during the sample period.
2. Modeling Time-varying Volatility
Motivated by the existing empirical literature about the market volatility, we assume here
that second order moments ﬁt to an EGARCH process, introduced by Nelson (1991). Unlike
GARCH, the EGARCH model imposes no positive constraints on estimated parameters and
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misspeciﬁcation in the volatility process. Accordingly, the dummies are embedded in the

























Where in equation (2), central t distribution allows stock returns have thicker tails, but is still
symmetric (Harvey and Siddique, 1999, 2000; Ang and Chen, 2002). Therefore, we assume that
TAIEX returns come from a non-central t distribution. Furthermore, in equation (3), EGARCH
model stressed an asymmetric function for past innovation shocks. ut is the innovation standard-
ized by dividing the random error by conditional variance, utet/ . In other words, (	ut1	
E	ut1	) signiﬁes the impact magnitude, size e#ect, coming from the unexpected shock and
qut1 indicates the sign e#ect in which the impact goes. Under such the condition, the positive
coe$cient, q, denotes the nonexistence of asymmetric volatility (leverage e#ect), while q is
negative, which is also statistically signiﬁcant, represents the presence of leverage e#ect. Moreover,
b ln ht1 exhibits the linkage between current volatility and past volatility. When b is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, it denotes that current volatility is a function of past volatility. Further-
more, to be as parsimonious as possible as suggested by Bollerslev et al. (1992), EGARCH (1,1)
model is practiced to capture the asymmetric volatility.
Furthermore, to allow for su$cient ﬂexibility in the estimation, we allow the squared root
of the conditional variance to enter the mean return equation, leading to an EGARCH-in-















D1 denotes the dummy of congressional e#ect. Where D1 equals 1 when it corresponds
with the Legislative Yuan being in session and recess equals 0 when in recess. Moreover, D2
represents the dummy of ﬁnancial reform, after the ﬁrst transfer of presidential power to an
opposition party,
1 New President Chen Shui-bian ranked the ﬁnancial reform as the highest
priority and simultaneously the Amendment to the Banking Law, the Financial Holding
Company Law, the Merger Law of Financial Institutions passed by the Legislative Yuan and
substantially deregulated foreign investors to Taiwan stock market on June 27, 2001. This
legislation is essential to improving ﬁnancial market e$ciency and to facilitate ﬁnancial
restructuring and liberalizing. Therefore, the sample period is further broken into a pre-
ﬁnancial reform period (D2 equals 0) and a post-ﬁnancial reform period (D2 equals 1). Finally,
D3 denotes the interactive e#ect of congressional e#ect and ﬁnancial reform (D3D1D2).
Where D3 equals 1 when it corresponds with the Legislative Yuan being in session during
1 After a long and di$cult and struggle, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ended over 50 years of Kuomin-
tang rule in ROC (Republic of China) in Year 2000 direct presidential election, marking the ﬁrst democratic
transfer of power and constructing democratic watershed in Taiwan.
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Moreover, it is well known that the Asian Financial Crisis, sparked from Thailand in July
2, 1997, has brought severe turmoil to Asian stock markets. So the Asian Financial Crisis made
a great impact on TAIEX may be investigated. Therefore, In order to estimate the impact of
Asian Financial Crisis, we interacted the EGARCH conditional-volatility equation (1) and
(3) with a multiplicative dummy, DM, where DM takes on a value of 0 prior to Asian Financial
Crisis and a value of 1 after Asian Financial Crisis. The signiﬁcant negative (positive)
-parameter estimate for aM and tM would indicate the decrease (increase) in the return and
volatility associated with Asian Financial Crisis.
The lags of conditional mean returns of GARCH (1,1) model is chosen as two by the
minimum value of the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1973) and the Schwarz Bayesian
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The parameters of the mean and time-varying conditional vari-
ance-covariance are jointly determined using the maximum likelihood estimation method.
Since the log likelihood function is a nonlinear function of the parameters, the algorithm
proposed by Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974), is used to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters.
IV. Data Descriptions and Empirical Results
1. Data Descriptions
This section presents a preliminary analysis of the Taiwan stock market. The trend of
Taiwan stock market and return are shown as Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 lists the basic
statistics of daily Taiwan stock returns during the sample period.
The mean of TAIEX returns is not signiﬁcantly di#erent from 0 at the 5% level. The
skewness of TAIEX returns series is negatively skewed at 5% signiﬁcance level and kurtosis
exhibits excess kurtosis at the 5% level. The skewness and kurtosis measurements are highly
signiﬁcant revealing departures from normality. Likewise, the Jarque-Bera statistic for TAIEX
returns series reject signiﬁcantly the assumption of the normality at the 5% level. Regarding the
shape parameters of the distribution of TAIEX returns, this study concludes that the distribution
is not clearly normal.
The Ljung-Box statistics of the TAIEX returns give Q(6)45.7043 and Q(12)52.0958
that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, revealing daily TAIEX returns have signiﬁcant
serial correlation. The unit root test result of the ADF and Phillips-Perron are exhibited in the
last two columns. TAIEX returns series are stationary and the lag interval is 2, which is
determined based on the minimum values of AIC and SBC. Since TAIEX return series have
been di#erenced by ﬁrst order, the non-stationarity does not impose a problem.
Table 2 listed the result of ARCH test to ﬁnd out if there is any heteroscedasticity (Engle,
1982) and diagnostic test (SBT, NSBT, PSBT, and JT) to ﬁnd out if the conditional
heteroskedasticity has any asymmetric e#ect (Engle and Ng, 1993). Based on the above
examination, the volatilities of TAIEX returns exhibit conditional heterscedastical and asym-
metry.
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Mean 0.0072 Std. Dev. 1.6434
Maximum 6.5469 Minimum 6.9757
Skewness 0.1004** Kurtosis 2.0427**
Q(6) 45.7043** Q(12) 52.0958**
ADF test 34.2227** P-P test 60.1618**
Jarque-Bera 685.3033** Sample Size 3904
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 1% (5%) level.
2. Normal test is checked by the Jarque-Bera test, which is based on Jarque and Bera (1987) and are
asymptotically chi-square distributed with 2 degree of freedom.
3. Q
2(6) (Q
2(12)) is the Ljung-Box Q statistic for the squared returns lagged 6 trading days and its
critical value at 5% signiﬁcant level is 12.5916 and 21.0261.
4. The ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and the P-P (Phillips and Perron) tests are under the
hypothesis (H0: unit root) which its critical value is decided on the critical value table of MacKinnon
(1991).
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This section presents an empirical result in Table 3a n dTable 4, respectively. Firstly, in
section 2.1, we employed EGARCH model to estimate the response of TAIEX stock returns
and volatilities to political uncertainty during congressional sessions (the Legislative Yuan) in
Table 3. Afterward, in section 2.2, we investigate how type of congressional e#ect can a#ect
TAIEX stock returns and volatilities in Table 4.
Testing for Congressional E#ect
For EGARCH (EGARCH-M) model diagnosing, the Ljung-Box statistics give Q(6)
6.5842 (5.9725) and Q(12)18.2208 (14.7955) for the standardized residual process and
Q(6)3.2638 (2.1767) and Q(12)11.2452 (8.9983) for the square process. Therefore, there
is no correlation or conditional heteroscedasticity in the standardized residuals of the ﬁtted
model. The above EGARCH and EGARCH-M model are adequate.
Comparing EGARCH and EGARCH-M models, Table 3 reveals that the coe$cient of
congressional dummy, a1, is signiﬁcantly negative at 5% signiﬁcant level on TAIEX returns.
Such negative results are consistent with Lamb et al (1997). Facing the political uncertainty
generated by the Legislative Yuan, such as policy disputes and violence, the investors become
more conservative and this may reduce the equity returns. In contrast, the insigniﬁcant
coe$cient, t1, in the volatility equation of Table 3 indicates that the congressional dummy has
no e#ect on TAIEX volatilities.
The dummy of ﬁnical reform, a2 in Table 3, shows that TAIEX returns are signiﬁcantly
lowered at the 1% level. Having replaced the KMT as the ruling party in the 2000 presidential
election, the DPP now faces criticism due to the recent economic recession. Despite the DPP
government provided a series of ﬁnical reform policies to facilitate ﬁnancial restructuring,
2
the DPP has failed to prevent a large outﬂow of Taiwan capital to Mainland China, resulting
in the closure of many factories and rising unemployment. Therefore, TAIEX returns have
dropped, causing huge losses for stockholders and deeply impacting economic performance.
Additionally, the signiﬁcant coe$cient, t2, indicates that longstanding ﬁtful ﬁnical and
economic policies has increased TAIEX volatilities following ﬁnical reform in Taiwan.
Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest an interesting result that during the congressional session,
2 Such as enacting the Merger Law to allow foreign and domestic ﬁnancial institutions to merge, e#ectively
reduce the Non-performing Loan (NPL) ratio, allow Financial Holding Companies to be established and deregu-
lated Qualiﬁed Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) foreign investors to Taiwan stock market.








1063.4426** 0.1522 5.8383** 3.1454** 829.7633**
(5.3375) (0.1723) (0.0860) (0.0867) (5.3798)
Notes: 1. ** (*) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at 1%(5%) level.
2. ARCH denotes the Lagrange Multiplier test of Engle (1982) and the criterion is 7.82 at the 5%
signiﬁcant level.
3. SBT, NSBT and PSBT denote the sign bias test, negative size bias test and positive size bias test
respectively and the criterion is 2.353 at the 5% signiﬁcant level.
4. JT denotes the joint test and the criterion is 7.82 at the 5% signiﬁcant level.
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and TAIEX volatilities (t3) increased signiﬁcantly. In fact, the new political ruling party, DPP,
lack governmental experience and minority in the Legislative Yuan, despite the DPP tried to
undertake projects to facilitate ﬁnancial restructuring. These reasons generated performance of
ﬁnical reform is not as good as the expectation of investors result in conservative investing action
that may reduce the TAIEX returns and increased TAIEX volatilities.
Finally, the insigniﬁcant coe$cient in Table 3, aM and tM, indicate that the impact of the
Asian Financial Crisis is insigniﬁcantly correlated with TAIEX returns and volatilities. This
result is consistent with Nieh (2002). Over the years, Taiwan has developed as a highly
diversiﬁed manufacturing center, producing hi-tech products for global markets. Moreover,
the government has e#ectively developed the industrial structure, small and medium enter-
prises, many of which are hi-tech start-ups ﬁnancially supported by the venture capital
T67A: 3. EHI>B6I>DC R:HJAI D; T=: AR-EGARCH MD9:A
Coe$cient
Variable
Estimation (EGARCH) Estimation (EGARCH-mean)
Return (ai) Volatility (ti) Return (ai) Volatility (ti)
Constant 0.0826** 0.0228** 0.0962** 0.0314**
(a0, t0) (0.0292) (0.0080) (0.0264) (0.0054)
Congressional E#ect 0.0937* 0.0054 0.0542* 0.0152
(a1, t1) (0.0386) (0.0092) (0.0269) (0.0124)
E#ect of Financial Reform 0.0313* 0.0023** 0.0625** 0.0144*
(a2, t2) (0.0143) (0.0067) (0.0304) (0.0059)
Interactive E#ect 0.0111* 0.0058* 0.0874* 0.0039*
(a3, t3) (0.0046) (0.0026) (0.0395) (0.0019)
E#ect of AFC 0.0146 0.0116 0.0417 0.0131


























Notes: 1. ** (*) denotse statistical signiﬁcance at 1%(5%) level and Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic
standard error.
2. Q(6) and Q
2(6) are the Ljung -Box Q statistic for the returns and the squared returns lagged 6
trading days and its critical value at 5% signiﬁcant level is 12.5916.
3. Q(12) and Q
2(12) are the Ljung -Box Q statistic for the returns and the squared returns lagged 12
trading days and its critical value at 5% signiﬁcant level is 21.0261.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December ,*0industry and the robust IPO market (Liu and Huang, 2005). Therefore, solid economic
fundamentals and ﬂexible industrial structure has maintained, making the economy very
robust and vibrant and Taiwan successfully surmounted the Asian Financial Crisis.
Testing for the E#ect of Government Bills, Statutory Bills and Emergency Bills
According to constitution, di#erent sessions of the Legislative Yuan are designed to achieve
three primary objectives. The Legislative Yuan shall hold two sessions each year. The ﬁrst session
shall run from February to the end of May, and the second session from September to the end of
December. If necessary, however, the session may be prolonged according to the law. In addition,
the Legislative Yuan may hold an extra session either at the request of the State President or upon
the request of more than one-fourth of the members. Furthermore, the primary objective of the
ﬁrst session of the Legislative Yuan that has the power to control the national budget before the
Government began to implement the national budget. Moreover, in the second session, the
Legislative Yuan must check by voting on issues such as statutory bills, auditing reports and other
important national a#airs. Finally, the Legislative Yuan may hold an extra session (i.e.
emergency bills) at the request of either the president or more than a quarter of the legislature
members. Therefore, based on the above statement, we further examine the existence of
congressional e#ect from various types including the government bills (D

1), the statutory bills
(D

2) and emergency bills (D

3).
Basically, the purpose of the government bills, the annual national budget, is focus on
national emphasis including the economic development, promoting the high technology industry,
the educational stu# and public security. In fact, facing the political uncertainty generated by the
Legislative Yuan, such as policy disputes and violence, the Taiwanese have no real choice, so





1, in the return and volatilities equation of Table 4 indicates that the e#ect of
the government bills of congressional dummy has no e#ect on TAIEX returns and volatilities
respectively.
The new government devised various policies to reform ﬁnancial system, but passing annual
national budget would be severely supervised and boycott from the opposition parties, even though
budget possible may be cut. Regarding the constantly changing of congressional political
situation, the investors seemed to lack conﬁdence and would hold the conservative position, during
the congressional sessions when examining the government bills after ﬁnancial reform. Therefore,
Table 4 showed that after the ﬁnical reform, TAIEX returns (a





In contrast, for the ruling party, due to neither becoming the majority in the Legislative
Yuan nor playing the leading role in the rules of procedure, the opposition party intent to
against deliberately, especially for the bills related to the ideology of political party. Further-
more, because not only without the uniﬁcation of the party and political leader before
delivering the bill to the Legislative Yuan, but also not to look for support from inter-party
negotiation with the opposition party, the congressional ine$ciency and disorder of congress
become familiar phenomenon in Taiwan and usually let people perceive political apathy and
alienation. Therefore, during the all sample period and post-ﬁnancial reform period, the

















7) were unable to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence TAIEX stock returns and volatilities respectively.




















i a[ut1Eut1qut1]b ln ht1
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1 denotes the dummy of government bills, D
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2 denotes the dummy of statutory bills, D
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3 denote the dummy
of emergency bills, D
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0) (0.0059) (0.0134) (0.0039) (0.0183)





1) (0.0644) (0.0111) (0.0663) (0.0142)





2) (0.0661) (0.0116) (0.0686) (0.0149)





3) (0.3677) (0.0924) (0.3075) (0.1108)


























































Notes: 1. ** (*) denotse statistical signiﬁcance at 1%(5%) level and Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic
standard error.
2. Q(6) (Q
2(6)) is the Ljung -Box Q statistic for the returns (the squared returns) lagged 6 trading
days and its critical value at 5% signiﬁcant level is 12.5916.
3. Q(12) (Q
2(12)) is the Ljung -Box Q statistic for the returns (the squared returns) lagged 12 trading
days and its critical value at 5% signiﬁcant level is 21.0261.
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This study empirically examines the behavior in stock market returns and volatilities
during sessions of the Legislative Yuan using the EGARCH model from January 1991 to May
2005. Our investigation found that TAIEX returns are signiﬁcantly negative 5% level, but
volatilities are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the congressional e#ect. However,
the e#ect of ﬁnancial reform on TAIEX returns is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level and is
signiﬁcantly increased at the 1% level of volatilities. Moreover, the congressional e#ect on
stock return following ﬁnancial reform signiﬁcantly drops that before ﬁnancial reform, and has
signiﬁcantly positive e#ects for the stock volatilities.
On the Whole, the ﬁndings above demonstrate that no congressional e#ect exists for
TAIEX volatilities. Perhaps the stock market was ine$cient and numb with this phenomenon
that the political uncertainty generated while the Legislative Yuan is always debating any
policies and issues. Nevertheless, after a series innovation of ﬁnancial policy (Merger Law and
Financial Holding Companies were established and the deregulation of foreign direct investors
to equity market), we found that the existence of congressional e#ect on TAIEX volatilities.
The empirical result implies that the investors rationally measure stock market e$ciently
reﬂect congressional activity and adjust their expectations to alter portfolio allocation accord-
ingly. Therefore, the investors would hold a conservative position during the congressional
sessions when examining the government bills especially. Future studies may further investi-
gate how the ﬁnancial markets reﬂect the behavioral changes of political ecology.
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